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CASENOTE
TRUMP V. HAWAII: DISSECTING THE CONTROVERSY OVER
PRESIDENTIAL IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Paul Taske*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2016 election cycle perhaps no other topic garnered
more attention than the discussions around immigration. Thencandidate Donald Trump made immigration a key aspect of his
campaign platform.2 Almost immediately after assuming office
President Trump attempted to fulfill his campaign promise to
institute a “Muslim Ban” by issuing Proclamation 13769. This
Proclamation suspended admission from seven countries in the
Middle East and North Africa for 90 days.3 Litigation ensued almost
immediately. A temporary restraining order was entered by the
western district court of Washington preventing the enforcement of
the entry restrictions.4 Ultimately, President Trump revised his order
two more times, and each time the new order was challenged in
court.5 Finally, this last proclamation ended up before the Supreme
Court.6
This case note will examine the Court’s decision in Trump
v. Hawaii and analyze the core of the decision in context with other
relevant areas of constitutional law. Part II provides a detailed
*
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Richard Lister, Outcry as Donald Trump calls for US Muslim Ban, BBC (Dec.
8, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-35036567/outcry-asdonald-trump-calls-for-us-muslim-ban.
3
82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017) (Foreign nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were barred from entering the United States for a 90day period.).
4
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (2017) (per curiam).
5
Executive Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017); International Refugee
Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v.
Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Proclamation No. 9645, 82
Fed. Reg. 45161.
6
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018).
2

factual background and summary of the majority opinion. Part III
examines the opinion in relation to other aspects of constitutional
law, primarily foreign affairs, immigration, and justiciability.
Finally, Part IV focuses on the alternative result proposed by the
dissenting opinions of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor and addresses
the potential ramifications of their proposals.7
II. FACTS
In July of 2018, on one of the final days of the term, the
Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii. The Court, in a 5-4
decision, found for the administration. To say the decision in the
case was controversial would be an understatement. In response to
the Court’s ruling, protests erupted across the country from New
York City to Seattle.8 These protests conveyed a sense of injustice
in the decision. The decision was seen as legitimizing President
Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric against Muslims.
The Court’s opinion deals primarily with two issues. First,
does the president have the authority, under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), to issue proclamations which place
temporary restrictions on the admission of foreign nationals and
restricts their entry into the United States? Second, does the
exclusion in this case violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment? The Court split 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the
opinion for the Court. Justices Breyer and Sotomayor authored the
two dissenting opinions.9
The Court began its analysis by addressing the case’s
procedural posture. Notably, the Court pays particular attention to
the different iterations of the Proclamation now before them. In its
7

Nothing in this case note is intended as a defense of the policies upheld by the
Court’s decision. Rather, this case note is intended to defend the outcome of the
case given the relevant constitutional considerations discussed below.
8
Meg Wagner, Brian Ries, and Veronica Rocha, Supreme Court Upholds Travel
Ban, CNN (June 27, 2018, 2:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/politics/livenews/supreme-court-travel-ban/index.html.
9
Justices Thomas and Kennedy also authored separate concurring opinions.

first iteration the proclamation blocked immigration from Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days. These
countries had previously been designated as posing heightened
terrorism risks by Congress or prior administrations.10 These
restrictions were, according to the Court, put in place to give the
administration adequate time to make inquiries to the governments
of these countries and collect necessary information to reduce the
risk of terrorism.11 The second proclamation was similar to the first
and included all countries mentioned in the first proclamation minus
Iraq. This second proclamation also included the ability to apply for
a waiver. Waivers were to be awarded on a case-by-case basis. The
second proclamation selected countries designated as “a state
sponsor of terrorism, has been compromised by terrorist activities,
or contains active conflict zones.”12 These restrictions, like the first
proclamation, were to be imposed for 90 days, pending completion
of a worldwide review.
Finally, a worldwide review was completed, and the third
proclamation was introduced.13 Included in the final set of
restrictions were eight countries whose information management
and sharing systems were deemed inadequate. This version included
a description of how foreign states were selected and included. The
State Department, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and several intelligence agencies developed a three-pronged
baseline test to determine whether a country’s reporting system was
adequate. First, does the country issue electronic passports, ensure
integrity of travel documents, report lost or stolen information, and
provide additional identity-related information? Second, does the
country disclose information about external risks, e.g., criminal
history, terrorist links, etc. Finally, the agencies weighed various
factors related to national security risks posed by a given country.14
Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen
10

Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2).
Id.
12
Executive Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 §1(d) (2017).
13
Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (2017).
14
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 4-5).
11

were identified as deficient in their risk profile and willingness or
ability to provide adequate information.15 Under the final version,
the Proclamation established varying restrictions to suit the risk
presented by each country and its willingness to cooperate with the
United States.16 The Proclamation also directed continual review of
the listed countries to determine whether any country had
sufficiently improved its practices. Upon one such review, Chad was
removed from the list of designated countries and the restrictions on
its nationals were lifted.17
The Court kept this development and background in mind
when considering the questions before it. Namely, whether the
President’s actions superseded his authority, contravened the INA,
or violated the Establishment Clause. The Court proceeded to
address each issue in turn.
When examining the scope of presidential authority, the
Court looked at two sections of the INA, §1182(f) and §§1185(a)(1).
In relevant part, §1182(f) states:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of
any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of
the United States, he may by proclamation, and for
such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants
or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens
any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.18
The language of §1182(f) provides a considerable amount of
deference to the President by its own terms. Words and phrases like
“Whenever,” “any,” “detrimental to the interests of the United
States,” and “for such period as he shall deem necessary” informed
the Court’s reading and determination that Congress afforded
immense deference to the President on matters of immigration

15

Id.
See Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 § 2 (2017).
17
Presidential Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (2018).
18
8 U.S.C. §1182.
16

restriction and national security.19 When examined in conjunction
with §§1185(a)(1),20 the Court found the delegation clear and
unambiguous. It also held that the Proclamation fit within the broad
grant provided by Congress.21
The INA does, however, impose one limitation on the
exercise of this broad discretion. The President must “find” that the
entry of some aliens is detrimental to the interests of the United
States. Based on the review the President ordered, the findings of
the relevant agencies, the crafting of a specific limitation scheme to
particular countries, and the report presented to Congress the Court
observed that it was clear the President met his statutory obligation
in this case. Further, these findings were deemed more extensive
than any previous administration’s immigration order.22
Additionally, the Court found the argument that the
Proclamation at issue violated other sections of the INA to be
without merit. Although §§1152(a)(1)(A) does prohibit nationalitybased discrimination for visa issuance it does not extend further.
However, entry and visa issuance are separate matters. If, according
to the Court, the President were to permit immigrants to enter the
country he could not then use nationality as a justification to deny a
visa application. However, he is permitted to make determinations
about entrance based on nationality.23
Finally, the Court turned to Appellee’s remaining argument,
that the proclamation violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.24 Appellees cited multiple instances where President
19

Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 10).
The President has authority under the INA to adopt reasonable rules,
regulations, and orders governing the entry and removal of aliens which may be
subject to the exceptions and limitation he prescribes.
21
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§1182(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B), and (a)(3)(C) which permit restrictions on the
basis of health-related grounds, criminal history, terrorist activities, and foreign
policy grounds respectively).
22
Id. at 11-15.
23
Id. at 20-24.
24
A brief discussion on standing was dealt with before turning to the
Establishment Clause issue itself. The Court decided in favor of standing for the
20

Trump spoke about the dangers of Muslims, Muslim immigration,
and Islamic terrorism. Also raised were the President’s references to
the Proclamation as a “Muslim Ban,” a “complete shutdown of
Muslim Immigration,” and other instances where the President
spoke disfavorably about Muslims.25 Yet, the Court distinguished
between these statements and the Proclamation itself. The Court’s
concern was solely with the Proclamation which, the Court
observed, is “neutral on its face” with respect to religion.26
One key aspect of the Court’s opinion on this issue is that
unlike a typical Establishment Clause case, which deals with
domestic policy regarding religion, this case concerns policies
surrounding national security.27 The Court noted that questions
concerning foreign relations, classifications made on political and
economic circumstances, and war powers are typically best handled
by the Executive and Legislative branches. Precedent on this front
has been uniform and robust—especially when cases involve an
overlap of national security interests and immigration policy.28 Such
decisions are not unique to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In
Free Speech jurisprudence, where the Court typically affords the
highest level of scrutiny, the Court recognized that those rules shift
slightly when confronted with questions of national security.29
Even, says the Court, were the Proclamation examined in
further detail, and weight afforded to extrinsic evidence and
statements, it would survive a rational basis review so long as a
justification is established which would not offend the

parties based on prior standing and Establishment Clause cases. See Id. at 25
(citing Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 7); School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 377 U.S. 203, 224, n. 9 (1963).).
25
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 27-28).
26
Id. at 29.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 31 (citing Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Kennedy J. concurring in
judgment) (slip op., at 3).
29
E.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding that
Congress may proscribe monetary contributions to designated terrorist groups
even when those funds are designated for non-terrorist activities).

Establishment Clause.30 In the Court’s judgment there are three key
factors which weigh against finding an Establishment Clause
violation based on improper animus. First, the Proclamation is
premised on legitimate purposes—restricting entry to nationals who
cannot be adequately vetted and pressuring such countries to reform
their own date collection practices.31 Second, since the first iteration
of the Proclamation was introduced, three Muslim-majority
countries have been removed from the list of restricted countries.
Those remaining Muslim-majority countries retain “conditional
restrictions” until the inadequacies of their reporting systems are
rectified.32 Third, even for those countries that remain conditionally
restricted, the policy permits exceptions for nationals to travel to the
United States on a variety of nonimmigrant visas.33 Finally, the
Proclamation contains a waiver provision. This waiver provision
covers all nationals seeking entry as immigrants or
nonimmigrants.34 These underlying considerations, the Court
reasoned, provide a sufficient national security justification to
survive rational basis review.35
The Court, via Chief Justice Roberts, treads a very fine line
in this opinion. It neither sanctions nor condones the wisdom of the
President’s Proclamation. As, indeed, by its own rationale it would
be a risk to do. Yet it firmly permits the President to continue
exercising control over national security issues as permitted in the
INA. The balance here is important as it involves a number of
constitutional concerns. The remainder of this note shifts to examine
some relevant considerations the Court touches on or implies

30

Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 32) (Noting that such
findings are rare and have only occurred when the law itself is so clearly based
on animus toward a protected group as to have no other possible conclusion).
31
Id. at 34.
32
Id. at 36.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 37 (requiring a determination to be made about whether denying entry
causes an undue hardship, whether the entry would pose a threat to public
safety, and if entry would be in the interest of the United States).
35
Id. at 38.

throughout its opinion and the potential ramifications had the Court
opted to intervene and strike down the proclamation.
II-B. HOLDING
The president lawfully exercised the broad discretion
granted to him under 8 U. S. C. §1182(f) to suspend the entry of
aliens into the United States; respondents have not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Presidential
Proclamation No. 9645 violates the establishment clause.
III. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
When dealing in constitutional law there are often many
competing concerns that may arise in any given case. In fact, there
are two issues which must be satisfied before any court is deemed
competent to hear the case: standing and justiciability. Though not
explicitly addressed in every merit decision, these considerations
must be kept in mind. When these requirements are not sufficiently
met a court must properly dismiss the case. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has dismissed several cases for lack of standing36
and justiciability.37 Other substantive areas of constitutional law
may also shed some light on the proper disposition of this case.
Particularly, looking at other cases concerning the First Amendment
abroad and other recent immigration cases ought to provide
necessary clarity and context. The Court addressed, in one form or
another, each of these issues. This section aims to add a bit of detail
36

See e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (Plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue under Article III because they had not suffered a concrete and
particularized injury and only presented a generalized grievance.).
37
See e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (The case
was dismissed for lack of judicial standards by which to decide the issue at
hand—political gerrymandering.). However, it should be noted that once
deemed non-justiciable does not mean an issue is necessarily so categorized
permanently. The Court has found renewed interest in formerly non-justiciable
questions recently. Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) is one such example.

and clarity about why these issues are important and how they apply
to President Trump’s Proclamation.
A. THRESHOLD CONCERNS
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court explicitly addressed the
standing concerns.38 And, while the Court mentioned justiciability
it made only a cursory reference to it rather than detail its
application.39 This failure to discuss justiciability thoroughly is a
significant defect in the Court’s opinion. Though reluctance to
expand on justiciability concerns is understandable based on the
nature of a justiciability inquiry itself.40
Justiciability is the doctrine which gives guidance to courts
about what issues are appropriate for review and which are best
suited to other branches of government. More commonly,
justiciability is also referred to as the Political Question Doctrine
and was formally articulated in a 1963 case, Baker v. Carr.41
The Baker Court highlighted six categories of questions
which, if brought before the Court, ought to be dismissed as
nonjusticiable. These questions are as follows: (1) Is there a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate branch of government; (2) is there is a lack of judicially
discoverable standards to resolve the issue; (3) would a decision
demonstrate a lack of respect to a coordinate branch of government;
(4) would a decision require an initial policy determination outside
the discretion of the Court; (5) would making a decision require
38

Trump v. Hawaii 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 24-26) (the Court found
that the three plaintiffs before them had sufficient standing to bring the case).
39
Id. at 8-9.
40
Consider one fundamental difference between standing and justiciability:
when the Court rejects a case on standing grounds it means the plaintiffs before
them are bringing the suit improperly. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that
still other plaintiffs might properly bring suit. In contrast, when the Court rejects
a case on justiciability grounds it means that the Court itself is deficient in
ability to hear the issue presented. E.g., Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall 506 (1869)
(Congress deprived the Court of jurisdiction by legislation).
41
369 U.S. 186 (1962).

unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6)
would a decision leave open the door for embarrassment of one or
more branches of government? 42 Such issues as may fall into one or
more of these categories should, the Baker Court said, be dismissed
as nonjusticiable political questions.
The decision in Trump v. Hawaii falls into at least two
categories outlined in Baker.43 There is a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment” in this area to both Congress and the
President, and there is a clear “lack of judicially discoverable
standards” to resolve the issue involved.
1. Textual Commitments
The Constitution divides power among the three branches of
government and between the federal and state governments. Broadly
speaking, the legislature is responsible for enacting laws which
apply to those within its jurisdiction. The executive is responsible
for ensuring the laws passed by the legislature are enforces. And the
judiciary is tasked with reviewing the laws and actions of the other
branches to ensure everything complies with the Constitution. Yet,
the operation of a government is rarely as simple as the elementary
explanation given above. The Constitution vests each branch with
certain powers, duties, and limitations which can—in some
instances overlap. For instance, Congress is granted complete and
plenary power over the area of immigration.44 The President acts as
Commander-In-Chief of the armed forces and, as the Court has
recognized, is the primary organ responsible for foreign affairs.45
These aspects of legislative and executive power are not always
42

Id. at 210-12.
It may be possible to identify additional categories occupied by this issue, but
for purposes of clarity and brevity this note is restricted to arguably the two
clearest limiting categories in this case.
44
U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 4.
45
U.S. Const. Art. II § 2; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (recognizing the President as the country’s sole organ in
the realm of foreign affairs).
43

coextensive but can coincide given the proper context. In such
circumstances Congress is permitted to delegate some of its
authority over immigration to the President so he may fulfill his role
in the realm of foreign affairs.46
While finding a textual reference to a given power does not
necessarily make an issue unreviewable by the courts, the existence
of plenary authority outside the realm of the Court’s expertise
generally will. In this case the Court was presented with two
complimentary plenary powers both dealing with the policies of the
United States to be established by a coordinate branch of
government. To review this case as if it were any other would
challenge the constitutional division of power among the branches.
The Court, however, did exercise a limited examination of
the underlying issue—the grant of authority itself. And, to that
extend the Court found that the President did not overstep the
authority granted by Congress’s delegation. According to the Court,
U.S.C. 8 §1182(f) explicitly grants the president authority to make
broad determinations regarding the admission of aliens to the United
States by proclamation. As the Court recognized in its decision, the
language of U.S.C. 8 §1182(f) exudes deference to the President in
every choice of word and phrase.47
2. Lack of Judicially Discoverable Standards
Judicial standards are a somewhat amorphous concept often
easier to point out where they are lacking that precisely where they
exist. In brief, judicially discoverable standards are found, at least in
part, by a combination of constitutional text and precedent. For
instance, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
contains judicially manageable standards. The Equal Protection
Clause “are well developed and familiar, . . . if on the particular facts
they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply
arbitrary and capricious action.”48
46

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 10).
48
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis in original).
47

Yet, when dealing with issues of foreign affairs and
immigration the standards are not so clearly developed. While the
Equal Protection Clause requires what has come to be known as
strict scrutiny, foreign affairs receive the most extreme form of
deference possible—perhaps not even rising to the level of a rational
basis standard. The Court has deferred to the executive’s judgement
on these matters in times of war and conflict, and generally when
matters arise concerning national security.49 This standard of
deference arises not because the Court has nothing to say about a
given policy but because it has no firm grounding in which to base
whatever may be said about a given policy whether positive or
negative.50
If no judicially manageable standards are present the Court
should dismiss the case as improvidently granted or refuse to grant
certiorari at all. These concerns, textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment and judicially discoverable standards are
crucial bedrock questions which must be sufficiently addressed
before any merits of the case are reached no matter how juicy the
policy question may be. Nonetheless, even if the plaintiffs in Trump
v. Hawaii did sufficiently demonstrate that the case was justiciable,
there are still substantive issues of constitutional law to address.51
49

E.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 5829 (1988) (President Regan)
(suspending the entry of certain Panamanian nationals “until such time as . . .
democracy has been restored in Panama”); Presidential Proclamation No. 6958
(1996) (President Clinton) (suspending entry for members of the Sudanese
government and armed forces); Presidential Proclamation No. 8693 (2011)
(President Obama) (suspending the entry of individuals subject to a travel
restriction under United Nation Security Council resolutions); Trump v. Hawaii,
585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 14) (noting that there have been 43 suspension
orders issued since the enactment of the INA).
50
Plaintiffs in Trump v. Hawaii attempt to provide judicially manageable
standards by raising an Establishment Clause concern. This will be addressed in
Part IV.
51
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9) (The Court “assumes
without deciding” that Plaintiff’s statutory claims are reviewable and do not
violate the Political Question Doctrine.). Presumably, this assumption carries on
to the Establishment Clause claim as well though justiciability is not mentioned
in that section of the opinion.

B. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTIUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The Constitution, according to Chief Justice Marshall, was
designed to provide the great outlines and important objectives
explicitly designated. The rest—i.e., the interplay between these
major objectives and any minor objectives—must be deduced from
the outlines provided.52 However, it would be naïve to base our
analysis on isolated clauses or even single Articles. As Justice
Jackson recognized, the Constitution intends both for a division of
power and for those powers to be integrated into a workable
government.53 In this case, it is helpful to examine the interplay on
issues of foreign affairs, immigration, and the First Amendment.
1. Foreign Affairs
As noted above, the Constitution grants Congress plenary
power over immigration.54 It also grants the President sole authority
in the field of foreign affairs.55 These separate grants of power have
not been understood as conflicting. Rather, in situations of
overlapping authority cooperation is required between the two
branches. Delegation has been one method of cooperation employed
by Congress to achieve its goal of comprehensive and uniform
immigration policy.56
Yet, cooperation and agreement are not always possible, and
when cooperation is possible a given action may still be challenged
by the states or the People. In such situations the Court relies on a
test developed by Justice Jackson to determine the permissible scope
52

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 200 (1819).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson J.
concurring).
54
U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 4.
55
U.S. Const. Art. II § 2.
56
E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(Congress can defer to the judgment of the President when dealing with foreign
affairs and foreign nationals).
53

of presidential authority. Justice Jackson’s framework divides the
scope of presidential authority into three categories denoting the
zenith, twilight, and ebb of presidential power.
First, if the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization by Congress, the President’s power is said to be at its
zenith or highest point. In such cases the President is able to act
using the Article II powers plus whatever authority Congress has
opted to delegate. Second, if the President acts without grant nor
denial of congressional delegation, the President’s power is said to
be in a “Twilight Zone” because there may be concurrent powers
held by both the President and Congress without a clear definition
of which shall be responsible for such action. In such circumstances
the President may take action not explicitly granted by Article II,
but which are believed necessary to further the duties of the office.
Finally, if the President acts in opposition to the express or implied
will of Congress, the President’s power is deemed to be at its
weakest ebb. In such circumstances the President must rely solely
on the powers explicitly vested by Article II.57 When the President
is acting at the lowest ebb of constitutional authority, courts may
review these actions and sustain the action only by restraining
Congress from acting concurrently—to avoid contradictory
mandates from the two branches. However, because such reviews
are, in practice, conclusive and preclusive they must be undertaken
with the utmost caution.58
In the present circumstances, President Trump’s
proclamation almost certainly falls squarely within the first of
Justice Jackson’s three categories. Congress’s intent was made
manifest in 1972 when the Immigration and Nationality Act was
passed. The Act makes clear, in at least two separate provisions, that
Congress intended to vest the President with the power to determine
which foreign nationals are permitted into the country, for what
reason foreign nationals may be denied entry, and to adopt
57

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson J.
concurring).
58
Id.

“reasonable rules” governing the admission and removal of aliens.59
In fact, the Court determined that the language of §1182(f) exudes
deference to the President at every opportunity.60
A broad grant of authority, however, would not give the
President authority to override sections of the INA which Congress
has expressly outlined the proper policy of the United States. When
a potential conflict is raised it is explicitly the province of the
judiciary to review and resolve the potential conflict.61 Plaintiffs
raised just such an argument before the Court. Plaintiffs alleged that
the Proclamation issued under the authority of §1182 and 1185(a)(1)
conflicted with §1152(a)(1)(A).62
The Court, however, disagreed with Plaintiffs’ contention
and highlighted the distinction between admissibility
determinations—under which the Proclamation was made—and
visa issuance which is a narrower subset of immigration policy. This
reading still holds in tact the prohibition against nationality-based
discrimination but refuses to expand the prohibition to the whole of
the immigration system. Such a broadening of the prohibition would
unduly hamper the President’s ability to make determinations
related to national security concerns.63
It is likely, however, even had the Court determined this
statutory issue to involve a conflict, the Court would have deemed
the Proclamation to balance these requirements appropriately based
on the case-by-case waiver provisions present in the Proclamation
itself. This, coupled with the Proclamation’s prima facie language
about national security and the broad grant of authority in §1182(f),
would have provided all necessary bases to uphold the Proclamation
on statutory grounds.
59

U.S.C. 8 §1182, 1185(a)(1).
U.S.C. 8 §1182(f) (deferential language includes such phrases as “Whenever
the President,” “any aliens or class of aliens,” “detrimental to the interests of the
United States,” etc.) (emphasis added).
61
Marbury v. Madison, 5 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
62
Providing that “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of
an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth,
or place of residence.”
63
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op. at 21).
60

2. Immigration
The realms of immigration and foreign affairs often coincide
with one another. Accordingly, it can be difficult to fully separate
the two but can also be helpful when confronted by issues with
several moving components. President Trump’s Proclamation is one
such instance. Although the proclamation certainly is concerned
with “foreign affairs” it is also directly related to “immigration” by
the admission and denial of persons into the United States.
The Court’s prior policy on matters of immigration has been
one of deference to the decisions made by the Executive and
Legislative branches.64 However, this policy is not necessarily
absolute or intended as a firewall for legitimate claims. For instance,
when other justiciable constitutional issues are present the Court
may properly resolve the dispute.65 In other words, immigration is
not an immediate bar to jurisdiction, but the Court will be cautious
when dealing in these areas to avoid overstepping its bounds and
violating Separation of Powers principles.
In fact, the Court recognizes that the scope of its inquiry into
matters of immigration which intersect with foreign affairs is
necessarily circumscribed.66 Further inquiry into the issue, even at
the government’s behest, would only serve to confuse the issue
because the question of jurisdiction is non-waivable.67 Therefore,
rather than examine the contours of immigration policy in this case,
the Court pivots to the First Amendment question. The Court notes,
however, even when examining the Proclamation from a different
perspective—i.e., the Establishment Clause—the policy will still be
upheld so long as it meets rational basis because of the caution the
Court adopts when matters of national security are facially involved.
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3. The First Amendment
As in the other sections of this discussion, the First
Amendment is tied, in this case, with issues of foreign affairs and
immigration. The difficulty, however, is applying existing First
Amendment precedent to the situation at hand. Most of the First
Amendment jurisprudence, particularly regarding the Establishment
Clause concerns purely domestic affairs.
There are rare exceptions, however. The Court references the
most recent of these hybrid cases, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, at various point throughout its opinion.68 In Holder, the
Court was confronted with an issue of national security which
intersected with traditionally protected First Amendment rights,
namely free speech. Certain American citizens wished to donate
funds to various international groups for humanitarian purposes;
however, these groups had been designated as terrorist organizations
by the Secretary of State.69
Despite the general and robust protection of the First
Amendment’s Speech Clause domestically, even the protection of
using money as speech,70 the court upheld the restriction on
donations to designated terrorist organizations. The Court stated that
when First Amendment issues are concerned it will not blindly defer
to the government’s reading of the First Amendment but will
consider such national security issues as the government raises
recognizing its own deficiencies in that area. Recognizing both its
role in protecting individual rights and its limitations in foreign
affairs, the Court narrowly addressed the question and held that the
material support statute in Holder did not violate the First
Amendment.
Similarly, the Court in Trump v. Hawaii also took pains to
recognize its deficiencies in the matter before them but did not
abdicate its judicial role. The Court, looking at what it took to be the
whole of relevant evidence, determined, both prima facie and in
68
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application, that the Proclamation did not violate the Establishment
Clause. The Court pointed to various considerations but paid
particular attention to the text of the Proclamation. The
Proclamation itself dealt with territory for the stated purpose of
prompting other countries to improve reporting practices with
various United States agencies. The Court also noted that the travel
restrictions have not been permanent and that once reporting has
improved countries are removed from the list of restricted nations.71
IV. ALTERNATE POSSIBILITES
The majority and dissent broadly agree on the case’s
underlying factual basis.72 While both dissenting opinions, the first
by Justice Breyer and the second by Justice Sotomayor, would find
the proclamation unconstitutional they arrive at that conclusion by
separate rationales.
Justices Breyer’s dissent is almost exclusively policy-driven.
Justice Breyer places heavy emphasis on the application of the
Proclamation’s various waivers and exceptions. He holds that these
exceptions to the blanket ban are largely being ignored and amount
to little more than window-dressing in an attempt to legitimize
naked religious discrimination.73 This discrimination, taken together
with President Trump’s external statements, suggests that the
injunction should remain in place until the issues has been fully
litigated below.74
Justice Sotomayor dissent, on the other hand, focuses on
prior Free Exercise jurisprudence to highlight the issue presented by
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the President’s Proclamation—the favoring or disfavoring of one
religion (Islam) over another.75 A reasonable observer, Sotomayor
asserts, would, based on the openly available data, historical context
of the proclamation, and the specific sequence of events leading to
it, conclude that the Proclamation was primarily intended to disfavor
Islam by excluding its adherents from the country.76
IV-A. BREYER’S DISSENT
Justice Breyer points to several instances where the statistics
surrounding the application of the Proclamation are disheartening.
These statistics tend to show that the waiver and exception clauses
contained within the Proclamation are not being utilized as robustly
as they might otherwise be. That these provisions are underutilized,
Breyer asserts, is evidence of invidious discrimination.77 Yet,
Breyer’s premise runs contrary to other decisions made by this
Court. The Court, when examining a policy for potential
constitutional issues, looks to the purpose of the policy itself—
largely by examining a statute’s text. Statistical information and
other external evidence are not sufficient to establish
unconstitutional state action.78 Rather, the policy itself must contain
the offending or discriminating language.79
This same standard is applied even when religious issues are
at play. If a law is not neutral and generally applicable—leaving
aside the potential issue of applicability to international issues—
then the law must be justified by a compelling governmental interest
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and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.80 Only if a statute
is not facially neutral while also being generally applicable or is not
justified by compelling interests achieved through a narrowly
tailored law will a statute be invalidated under the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.81 Similarly, in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence the neutrality principle is employed when
evaluating governmental actions or policies.82
The Proclamation, and its history, contains several key
features which should assuage some trepidation surrounding the
controversial policy. First, the Proclamation applies to countries and
not specific religious sects within countries. Second, the exceptions
to the broad restrictions prescribed by the proclamation are
individual in nature and also fail to target religious sects for favored
or disfavored treatment.83 Finally, over the course of the
Proclamation’s development, and current implementation, three
Muslim-majority countries were removed from the list of restricted
countries.84
Although Justice Breyer raises interesting points of concern
about the Proclamation, his method of reasoning is not consistent
with the standards generally persuasive to the Court on issues of
constitutional law. And, as Justice Breyer mentions at the close of
his opinion, despite the Court’s striking down of the national
injunction issued by the district court, the district court is still free
to examine this issue further. Now the district court must simply do
so without an injunction in place while it deliberates.85
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IV-B. SOTOMAYOR’S DISSENT
Unlike Justice Breyer, in her dissent, Justice Sotomayor is
primarily concerned with the First Amendment issues posed by
President Trump’s Proclamation. In short, Sotomayor believes that
President Trump’s statements and tweets about his Proclamation,
“travel-ban,” or “Muslim-ban” present enough evidence to show
that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause
claim because they depart so starkly from the Establishment
Clause’s guarantee of neutrality. Therefore, she would affirm the
Ninth Circuit’s decision and uphold the injunction.86
Justice Sotomayor references a plethora of First Amendment
precedent to justify her stance on this issue. The case law she cites
highlights the importance of neutrality toward religion and refusing
to favor or disfavor one religion or another.87 She combines this
principle with the argument that Congress has already enacted a
fully sufficient system of immigration control. This system,
therefore, renders the Proclamation unnecessary, repetitive, and to
the extent that it deviates from Congress’s established system,
harmful.88 This argument is bolstered by amici who contend that the
policy set forth in the Proclamation is harmful to the interests of the
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United States and extensive detailing of various provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.89
Yet, Justice Sotomayor’s argument is susceptible to at least
three primary criticisms. First, despite her plethora of citations, the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence she cites deals almost entirely
with domestic application of the First Amendment. She does not
address the implications cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project and the impact such internationally focused applications of
the First Amendment would have on her theory.90 Second, her use
of Arizona v. United States is misplaced. Arizona focused on the
dispersion of immigration authority between Congress and the
individual states rather than the interplay of co-equal branches of
government.91 And, finally, Justice Sotomayor’s reliance on the
opinions of various amici such as the “Former National Security
Officials” highlights that these decisions are one of policy best left
to other political branches to resolve. As such, these political
decisions weigh against the Court having jurisdiction over the issue
at all.92
One final piece worth mentioning in Sotomayor’s dissent
comes from a footnote. Sotomayor challenges the notion that the
Court should defer to the Executive Branch on this issue. This
challenge is supported by the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
which explicitly says that although the Constitution envisions a
strong role for the executive in the context of foreign affairs, “it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches of government when
individual liberties are at stake.”93 Although this point may be
enough to overcome issues concerning justiciability and political
questions it would not extend so far as to govern the outcome of this
89
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or any given case where “a role for all three branches” exists when
handling issues of national security.
IV-C. WHAT IF?
When examining hot-button issues, it can often be helpful to
hypothesize about what the alternative outcome might have looked
like to better understand the strengths or weaknesses of the actual
outcome and of the dissenting or opposing view.
What might the alternative outcome have looked like in this
case? In the concrete the answer is simple. The injunction would
have been upheld and the Proclamation would have been deemed
unconstitutional. The implications for that decision, however, would
have been somewhat more complicated. Had the majority lost and
the dissenting justices prevailed, the Supreme Court would have
intervened in the area of foreign affairs and immigration. What’s
more, it would have done so when Congress delegated its authority,
in relevant part, to the executive and granted the Executive broad
discretion. The Supreme Court would, in effect, have final authority
over matters of immigration and foreign affairs where previously
they had almost none.
Perhaps the most effective illustration of the impact of this
hypothetical situation would be best accomplished through analogy.
Luckily, it is not necessary to invent a hypothetical scenario. The
Supreme Court has already provided an apt example for
comparison.94 In McCreary the State of Kentucky made several
arguments before the Court regarding displays in the state
courthouse. The first appearance dealt with a display of the Ten
Commandments. The Court found this violated the establishment
clause and showed evidence of state preference for the Jewish and
Christian religions.95 Kentucky fared no better in its second or third
appearance before the Court. Each time Kentucky endeavored to
comply with the Court’s mandate proscribing religious preference.
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First Kentucky elected to include the Commandments among other
religious passages to dispel the impression of state-preference to
religion.96 The second alteration still included the Ten
Commandments but as a portion of a larger presentation focusing on
the foundations of American law.97 The Court considered these
alterations in light of Kentucky’s past displays and ultimately found
each to still be unduly preferential toward religion and altogether
lacking in a secular purpose.98
It is not difficult to notice the similarities between the
Court’s approach in McCreary and the analysis engaged in by the
dissenting justices in this case. As such, it is not unreasonable to
assume that a similar standard would have applied had the result
been in the dissenting justices’ favor. And, while domestic issues—
such as religious displays in a state courthouse—permit for long and
drawn-out proceedings before the Court, issues dealing with
national security do no always permit such lengthy periods of
uncertainty. Yet, had the Court assumed a similar role here as it did
in McCreary, uncertainty would surely have been introduced into
foreign affairs. The President, current and future, would be subject
to approval by the Court before he or she could confidently expect
an order or policy to be put into effect. Such important spheres do
not, of course, render a President immune from all potential action—
nor should they. Yet, it is important to recognize the inadequacy of
courts to deal with these issues and thus why they often defer to the
Executive or Legislative branches in these areas.99
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V. CONCLUSION
As this case demonstrates, several constitutional
considerations might easily be presented by a single case. These
issues are often difficult to resolve either for legal or other reasons.
Yet, it is precisely the role of the courts to determine what the result
of a given case ought to be and whether it has authority to resolve a
given issue. It is also the responsibility of the Supreme Court to look
forward and judge how a given opinion might impact future cases
and other areas of law.100 In this case, the Court opted to exercise
caution. The Court chose to avoid future legal quadrangles and rely
on a tested constitutional principle: Separation of Powers.
Although the Court refrained from striking down the
Proclamation, neither this decision nor the Separation of Powers
doctrine leaves the President immune in this area. Rather, the Court
simply acknowledged the inherently political nature of these issues
and left it to the political branches of government to resolve.
Congress delegated some of its immigration authority to the
President. It is Congress, therefore, that must assess and, if
necessary, revise that delegation of power. The only question that
remains is whether Congress will choose to reclaim its authority or
whether Congress will permit the current distribution of power to
persist. In either case, it is Congress that must take up the mantle of
responsibility on this issue.
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